USA v. Joseph Donahue by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-22-2014 
USA v. Joseph Donahue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Joseph Donahue" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 870. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/870 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-4767 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH P. DONAHUE 
         ________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 3:11-cr-00033) 
Honorable A. Richard Caputo, District Judge 
________________ 
 
Argued June 10, 2014 
 
BEFORE: AMBRO, GREENBERG, and BARRY, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 22, 2014) 
______________ 
 
 
  2 
Peter J. Smith, Esq. 
Todd K. Hinkley, Esq. (argued) 
Office of United States Attorney 
235 North Washington Avenue 
P.O. Box 309, Suite 311 
Scranton, PA 18503 
 
     Attorneys for Appellant 
 
 
Gino A. Bartolai, Jr., Esq. (argued) 
88 North Franklin Street  
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701 
  
     Attorney for Appellee 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In light of the “automobile exception” to the usual search 
warrant requirement, it is difficult to pick a worse place to 
conceal evidence of a crime than an automobile.  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted—and reinterpreted—the automobile 
exception so expansively that the Court essentially has obviated 
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the requirement that the government obtain a warrant to search a 
vehicle provided it has probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contains evidence of a crime.  Nevertheless, appellee Joseph 
Donahue made a successful challenge in the District Court to the 
warrantless search of a vehicle that he had been driving but did 
not own because the Court accepted his contention that the 
government did not have probable cause for the search.  The 
government appeals from the suppression order entered on 
November 19, 2013. 
We trace the immediate background of this case to 
Donahue’s conviction for fraud and related offenses and the 
resulting ten-year custodial sentence that a district court imposed 
on him in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The court 
directed Donahue to surrender by a given time at a designated 
place to serve this sentence but he did not do so.  Consequently, 
the court issued a warrant for his arrest and a short time later 
United States marshals apprehended Donahue in Las Cruces, 
New Mexico, while he was in his son’s Ford Mustang.  The 
marshals took possession of the Mustang and, over the next five 
days, personnel from two different federal agencies searched the 
vehicle several times, photographed, and even x-rayed it, all 
without applying for or obtaining a search warrant.  Eventually 
an FBI agent found a firearm magazine clip under the Mustang’s 
driver’s seat, a discovery that led to their finding a semi-
automatic pistol in a bag that they had seized from the 
Mustang’s trunk.   
Donahue’s failure to surrender and the recovery of the 
pistol resulted in a grand jury returning indictments against him 
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania for failure to surrender 
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under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(2) and (b)(1)(A)(i) and for firearms 
offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (2), 922(j), and 
924(a)(2).  Donahue filed a motion to suppress evidence found 
in the Mustang and in a hotel room in Las Cruces in which he 
had registered under a false name.  The District Court granted 
the motion on the ground that the government lacked probable 
cause for the searches.  United States v. Donahue, No. 3:11-cr-
00033, 2013 WL 6080192, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2013).  The 
government appealed from the suppression order to the extent 
that the Court suppressed evidence found in the Mustang.  The 
government, however, did not appeal from the portion of the 
order suppressing the evidence seized in the hotel room.   
Even though it is clear that the government had the 
opportunity to seek a warrant before searching the Mustang, we 
hold that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
obviated its need to do so as the government had probable cause 
for the search of the Mustang and its contents.1  Inasmuch as the 
automobile exception was applicable, there were virtually no 
temporal, physical, or numerical limitations on the search’s 
scope.  Thus, the government could make a broad search of the 
Mustang including its contents, even if contained in packages—
and could repeat the search as long as it remained in continuous 
control of the Mustang.2  The government took advantage of this 
                                                 
1As we explain later, there were several searches of the Mustang 
and, because the initial search was lawful, the searches that 
followed also were lawful here.  Therefore, we sometimes refer 
to all of the searches as a single search.  
 
2We are not concerned in this opinion with a situation in which 
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broad authority and, in making its search lawfully uncovered 
evidence that Donahue had committed weapons-related 
offenses.  Consequently, the District Court should not have 
suppressed the evidence the government seized in the search.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the order suppressing the evidence 
seized in the search of the Mustang and its contents and we will 
remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
     
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Donahue enticed individuals to engage in his business 
ventures so that he could appropriate their identities and make 
unauthorized purchases using their credit.  This scheme led to 
his conviction for 16 counts of bank fraud, money laundering, 
accessing an unauthorized device, and making false statements.  
United States v. Donahue, 460 F. App’x 141 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(affirming conviction).  On December 3, 2010, the District 
Court sentenced Donahue to a 121-month custodial term and 
ordered him to pay $325,414 in restitution.  Id. at 142.  The 
Court directed Donahue to surrender by January 4, 2011, at his 
place of confinement at Fort Dix, New Jersey.  
Donahue, however, did not surrender as ordered, and 
consequently the District Court issued a warrant for his arrest on 
January 5, 2011.  Instead of surrendering, Donahue drove across 
the country in his son’s red Ford Mustang to Las Cruces in an 
attempt to avoid imprisonment.  This attempt came to naught 
                                                                                                             
the government’s control of the vehicle was not continuous. 
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when United States marshals in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, became aware that Donahue 
might be in Las Cruces and notified authorities there of that 
information.  Two weeks after Donahue should have 
surrendered, United States marshals in Las Cruces, assisted by 
New Mexico State University police, arrested him near the 
campus when they saw him exit a hotel in which he had 
registered under an alias and enter his son’s Mustang.  United 
States Marshal Steven Archuleta and other officers ordered 
Donahue to exit the Mustang and he did so without incident.  
Archuleta then arrested and searched him, finding about $2,500 
in cash.   
After Archuleta handcuffed Donahue and took him to his 
patrol car, he looked into the Mustang and saw a “very messy” 
interior, J.A. 123, containing, among other items, various maps 
in plain view.  Following instructions from his supervisor and a 
deputy United States marshal in Scranton, Archuleta seized the 
Mustang—a step that he acknowledged he “probably” would not 
have taken without those orders.  J.A. 155.  Inasmuch as 
Archuleta did not know “exactly what [evidence] was needed,” 
J.A. 147, he also entered Donahue’s hotel room to take the trash 
from it and to conduct a superficial search: he glanced around 
the room but did not open any drawers or look into the closets.  
As we have indicated, the government did not have a warrant for 
these searches.   
The government subsequently transferred the Mustang to 
a marshals’ facility in Las Cruces, where the marshals searched 
it pursuant to their inventory policy.  Archuleta and two other 
deputy marshals photographed the vehicle “without essentially 
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moving anything around,” J.A. 124, searched its trunk and cabin 
(including the glove box and other compartments), and removed 
loose items.  This process revealed non-incriminating items and 
closed bags, which at that time the marshals did not open.  The 
marshals then transferred the vehicle to a public garage and 
placed the bags and other items that they removed in a secure 
holding area.     
The next day, again under instructions from Scranton—
this time from an FBI regional office—an FBI agent in New 
Mexico, Amy Willeke, retrieved the Mustang and drove it to an 
FBI facility.  When Willeke reached the FBI facility, she made a 
second inventory search of the Mustang during which she 
discovered a Glock .40 caliber magazine behind the driver’s 
seat.   
After logging her discovery into evidence and having the 
car x-rayed, Willeke directed another agent to obtain Donahue’s 
loose items that the Marshals still possessed so that FBI agents 
could inventory the items and transfer them to Scranton.  On 
January 25, 2011, five days after Donahue’s arrest, Archuleta 
and an FBI agent opened and searched the previously seized 
bags and found a Glock semi-automatic pistol.  
 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The foregoing events led a grand jury in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania to return an indictment against Donahue 
for failure to surrender and for weapons charges.  Donahue 
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subsequently moved in the District Court to suppress all the 
evidence seized from the Mustang and the hotel room, arguing 
that the warrantless searches were unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  After a hearing, the Court granted 
Donahue’s motion by order dated November 19, 2013.  
Donahue, 2013 WL 6080192. 
 Before addressing the substance of Donahue’s motion, 
the District Court found that he had standing to challenge the 
searches even though he had registered in the hotel under an 
alias and did not own the Mustang.  Id. at *3-5.  The Court then 
held that the conditions for the automobile exception, which, if 
applicable, would have allowed the government to make a 
warrantless search of the Mustang, had not been met because the 
government lacked probable cause to believe that there was 
contraband in the vehicle.  Id. at *6.3    
 The government appeals, making only one of the 
arguments it raised in the District Court.  Challenging the basis 
for the Court’s order head-on, the government contends that it 
had probable cause to search the Mustang because it was 
reasonable to believe that Donahue would be in possession of 
items that could help him avoid detection and that the 
possession of those items would support a charge that he 
knowingly failed to surrender to serve his sentence.  Appellant’s 
br. at 13-14.  According to the government, none of the items 
                                                 
3 Although Donahue at oral argument on this appeal emphasized 
that the government did not have a search warrant, in his brief 
he does not contend that it needed a warrant to make the search 
regardless of whether it had probable cause for the search. 
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found in plain view in the Mustang, including the materials that 
were not contraband (such as maps, newspapers and luggage) 
should have been suppressed.  That evidence, the argument runs, 
though not contraband, helped establish probable cause for the 
government to conduct a full search of the vehicle.  The 
evidence also tended to show that Donahue had planned his 
flight and acted deliberately in violation of the statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3146(a)(2), that criminalizes knowing failures to surrender, 
and that his failure to surrender was not the result of 
circumstances beyond his control.  The latter point was 
significant because if it could be shown that circumstances 
beyond Donahue’s control had precluded him from surrendering 
as ordered, Donahue would have had an affirmative defense to 
the failure-to-surrender charge, see 18 U.S.C. § 3146(c).  
Appellant’s br. at 16-17.   
   
IV.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231,4 and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  “We 
review a district court’s grant of the motion to  suppress for 
clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review 
as to its legality in light of the court’s properly found facts.”  
United States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).  On 
                                                 
4 Donahue does not contend on this appeal that under U.S. 
Const. art. 3, § 2, cl.3, venue for the weapons charges should 
have been in the District of New Mexico.   
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this appeal we exercise only plenary review, as there is no 
dispute of any material fact.   
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” of their “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  But this protection 
is triggered only if the state invades an area in which the person 
has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 
965 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 
88 S.Ct. 507, 587 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Thus, a 
defendant moving to suppress evidence seized in a search “bears 
the burden of proving not only that the search . . . was illegal, 
but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy” in the 
subject of the search.  Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 
100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980).  The latter inquiry turns on two 
specific questions:  “(1) whether the individual demonstrated an 
actual or subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of the 
search or seizure; and (2) whether this expectation of privacy is 
objectively justifiable under the circumstances.”  Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 2012).   
After our initial examination of this appeal, we requested 
supplemental briefing on the question of whether Donahue, who 
was a fugitive,5 could assert that he had a reasonable expectation 
                                                 
5Although Donahue admits that he was apprehended across the 
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of privacy in any seized object.  We also directed that the briefs 
address the question of whether the government had preserved 
an expectation-of-privacy issue for our review.  In this regard 
we note that inmates generally do not possess a legitimate 
expectation of privacy, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 
104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984), and other courts of appeals have 
held that prisoners do not re-acquire the right to such an 
expectation when they escape from prison, United States v. 
Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United 
                                                                                                             
country from New Jersey where he was to surrender to start 
serving his period of incarceration, he insists that he was not a 
“fugitive” even though the District Court had issued a warrant 
for his arrest when he did not surrender.  Appellee’s 
supplemental br. at 2-3.  He cites a firearms-control statute that 
defines a “fugitive from justice” as someone who “has fled from 
any State to avoid prosecution.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15).  
Donahue’s logic, it appears, is that he fled the consequences of 
his prosecution (i.e., incarceration), rather than the prosecution 
itself.  But see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414 
n.10, 100 S.Ct. 624, 636 n.10 (1980) (“[A]n escaped prisoner is, 
by definition, a fugitive from justice.”).  We do not comment on 
whether his interpretation of that particular statute is relevant 
because Donahue’s exact technical status as a fugitive does not 
bear on our probable-cause inquiry.  Regardless of what 
circumstances result in an individual being regarded as a 
fugitive under any particular statute, the ordinary meaning of the 
word includes “[a] person who flees or escapes” and a “criminal 
suspect . . . who . . . evades . . . imprisonment.”   Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining “fugitive”).  Consequently, 
we will refer to Donahue as a fugitive.   
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States v. Roy, 734 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1984), or when 
they abscond after a mistaken release, United States v. Ward, 
561 F.3d 414, 417-18 (5th Cir. 2009).  See United States v. 
Randolph, 210 F. Supp. 2d 586, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 80 F. 
App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2003).   
Although Donahue may have forfeited any expectation of 
privacy that he arguably had in the Mustang or its contents after 
he failed to surrender, we decline to address that possibility 
because the government did not raise it in the District Court and 
thus did not preserve it for our review.  See Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204, 208-11, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646-47 (1981) 
(precluding government from arguing for the first time on 
appeal that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy); see also United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  Rather, the government made the expectation-of-
privacy argument in the District Court that Donahue did not 
have an expectation of privacy in the Mustang or its contents or 
in the hotel room in the first place, a contention that, if accepted, 
would have rendered a forfeiture argument moot as Donahue 
would have had nothing to forfeit.  The government, however, 
has abandoned even that narrow contention on appeal.   
Given that the government has not advanced, or at least 
preserved for our review, any expectation-of-privacy issue on 
this appeal, we limit our inquiry to the question of whether the 
automobile exception authorized the government to search the 
Mustang without a warrant.6  The automobile exception permits 
                                                 
6 The District Court declined to apply the inventory exception or 
the inevitable discovery rule—conclusions that the government 
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vehicle searches without a warrant if there is “probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.”  United 
States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1123 (3d Cir. 1991), abrogated 
on other grounds by United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 
F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).   The government bears the 
burden of establishing the applicability of the exception, United 
States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1143 (3d Cir. 1992), by a 
preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 
782, 785 (9th Cir. 1987).   
Although “the scope of the warrantless search authorized 
by [the automobile exception] is no broader and no narrower 
than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant,”  
                                                                                                             
does not challenge on appeal.  Donahue, 2013 WL 6080192, at 
*7-11.  In addition, although the government alluded to another, 
similar exception in its brief in the District Court, it never fully 
argued here or in that Court that it performed a valid search of 
the car incident to Donahue’s arrest.  Case No. 3:11-cr-00033, 
Doc. No. 188 at 8.  That justification permits vehicle searches 
incident to arrest if it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant 
to the crime of arrest might be found.”  Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 335, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009).  The Gant incident-
to-arrest exception is both broader and narrower than the 
automobile exception: it requires a lesser basis for a search than 
a showing of probable cause, United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 
14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010), but “does not extend to evidence of 
other offenses,” United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 42 (1st 
Cir. 2011).  Because of the limited scope of the government’s 
arguments, we consider only one potentially relevant exception 
to the search warrant requirement, the automobile exception.   
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United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173 
(1982), the automobile exception includes two important 
elements specific to that exception:  First, “[i]f probable cause 
justifies the search . . . , it justifies the search of every part of the 
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 
search.”  Id., 102 S.Ct. at 2173.  Second, probable cause does 
not dissipate after the automobile is immobilized because the 
exception does not include an exigency component.  Maryland 
v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 2014 (1999).  As a 
result, the government can search an impounded vehicle without 
a warrant even though it has secured the vehicle against the loss 
of evidence and it has the opportunity to obtain a warrant for the 
search.  See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261, 102 S.Ct. 
3079, 3080-81 (1982); see also United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 
478, 486-87, 105 S.Ct. 881, 886 (1985) (extending the rule to 
closed packages seized from vehicles).  
The broad sweep of the automobile exception is of 
controlling significance in this case because if we determine, as 
in fact we do, that the government had probable cause to seize 
and search the Mustang, two more conclusions will follow from 
that determination.  First, the government was justified in 
opening the bag found in the Mustang’s trunk containing the 
pistol.  See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 573 F.3d 465, 475 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“[U]nder the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement, [the police officers] were authorized to 
open the bag and seize the handgun.”).  Second, the delay 
between the time that the government seized the Mustang and 
the time of the search that uncovered the weapon—five days 
after the government impounded the vehicle—was immaterial.  
See Johns, 469 U.S. at 487-88, 105 S.Ct. at 887 (holding that 
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warrantless search of containers seized from a vehicle already 
impounded for three days “was reasonable and consistent with 
our precedent involving searches of impounded vehicles”); 
United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding warrantless search of a vehicle 38 days after it was 
impounded); United States v. McHugh, 769 F.2d 860, 865-66 
(1st Cir. 1985) (approving search seven days after truck’s 
seizure because the Supreme Court declined to impose an 
“arbitrary temporal restriction” on the automobile exception).7     
As a related matter, our analysis does not distinguish 
among the government’s searches starting with Archuleta’s 
search, followed by Willeke’s search, and concluding  with the 
opening of the closed bags.  We see nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence to indicate that the automobile exception 
may justify only a single search of a seized vehicle.  To the 
contrary, the Court has based its reasoning allowing warrantless 
searches of vehicles in part on the diminished expectation of 
privacy in a vehicle, and thus the Court’s reasoning supports the 
conclusion that so long as the government maintains continuous 
control over the vehicle it needs probable cause only for its 
initial search and seizure and that subsequent searches should be 
viewed as part of an ongoing process.   United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484 (1977) (“One 
has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its 
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence 
or as the repository of personal effects . . . .  It travels public 
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in 
                                                 
7 Donahue has not raised any chain-of-custody issue.  
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plain view.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).  The 
degree of expectation of privacy does not expand during the 
time that the government possesses the vehicle.  Indeed, if 
anything, the seizure may lessen it. 
Thus, the validity of the search in this case depends 
entirely on whether the government had probable cause when it 
seized the Mustang to believe that it contained evidence of a 
crime.8  The probable cause inquiry is “commonsense,” 
“practical,” and “nontechnical;” it is based on the totality of the 
circumstances and is judged by the standard of “reasonable and 
prudent men.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 103 S.Ct. 
2317, 2328 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  We evaluate “the events which occurred leading up to 
the . . . search, and then . . . [decide] whether these historical 
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable 
police officer, amount to . . . probable cause.”  Ornelas v. United 
                                                 
8 Contrary to the government’s suggestion, a showing that there 
is probable cause to believe that a search will reveal evidence 
refuting a potential affirmative defense does not, by itself, 
authorize a search.  In this regard, we point out that inasmuch as 
the government before making an arrest and search based on the 
presence of probable cause is not obligated to investigate 
potential defenses, see, e.g., Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 
386 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2004), it should not be permitted to use 
the possibility that those defenses may be available as a reason 
to invade an individual’s right to privacy by making a search.  
What matters for purposes of probable cause is the likelihood of 
obtaining evidence of a crime.   
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States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-62 (1996).   
At bottom, “we deal with probabilities,” Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 231, 103 S.Ct. at 2328.  If there was a “fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime” would have been found, 
there was probable cause for the search.  Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 
2332.  To that end, we conclude that it was reasonable to believe 
that the Mustang contained items showing that Donahue 
“knowingly” failed to surrender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
3146(a)(2).  After all, the government agents knew that Donahue 
had failed to surrender as ordered, and Archuleta explained that, 
based on his extensive experience with fugitives, they are likely 
to have false identification documents, J.A. 109, which 
commonly are found in places where items are “ready and 
available . . . to gather up and leave quickly,” such as their cars, 
id. 108-11.   
The District Court took a different approach to the 
probable cause question.  It focused on Archuleta’s concession 
at the suppression hearing that he searched the Mustang because 
the marshals in Scranton wanted him to do so.  This testimony 
led the Court to suggest that Archuleta did not necessarily 
believe he had probable cause for the search.  Donahue, 2013 
WL 6080192, at *7.  The Court also concluded that the items in 
plain view, such as maps and newspapers, which Archuleta 
observed when he first looked into the Mustang, were not 
contraband and thus their presence could not have formed the 
basis for probable cause for a search of the vehicle.  Id.  Finally, 
the Court reasoned that Donahue’s “crime was completed after 
he failed to surrender for service of his sentence” and, “[a]s a 
result, there was not a fair probability that a search of the Ford 
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Mustang would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.”  Id.    
We reject each of these conclusions, and do so exercising 
plenary review because the District Court did not ground its 
conclusions on findings of disputed facts.  See Ornelas, 517 U.S. 
at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663; United States v. Harple, 202 F.3d 194, 
196 (3d Cir. 1999).   First, we point out that our probable cause 
inquiry “is entirely objective,” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 
299 (3d Cir. 2014), and that while subjective belief may be 
relevant in a probable cause inquiry to the extent that it reveals 
facts material to a probable cause determination, Archuleta’s 
testimony with respect to his beliefs was not particularly 
enlightening in this regard.  Furthermore, we find nothing in the 
record to support a conclusion that Archuleta conceded he 
lacked probable cause to search the Mustang; rather he testified 
that the immediate reason he undertook the search was that he 
was carrying out the instructions sent from Scranton and the 
directive from his supervisor.  But his statements about fugitives 
possessing incriminating material is consistent with the 
conclusion that he believed that he had probable cause for the 
search.  See J.A. 122 (“I did believe that there could be items in 
the vehicle to show that he was a fugitive and certain contraband 
could be in that vehicle, yes, sir.”).  In any event, Archuleta’s 
opinion as to whether he had probable cause for a search does 
not matter because an officer might have probable cause to 
make a search even if he believes to the contrary.  See United 
States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Just as a 
subjective belief by the arresting officer would not establish 
probable cause where none existed, a subjective belief by the 
arresting officer cannot destroy probable cause where it 
exists.”).   
  19 
We also reject the District Court’s suggestion that an 
officer could establish that there was probable cause for a search 
only if he believed that the search would reveal contraband.  
Donahue, 2013 WL 6080192, at *7 (concluding that the items 
that Archuleta observed in the Mustang were “not contraband” 
and thus their presence could not support the belief that the 
Mustang “contained contraband”).  The courts in making Fourth 
Amendment analyses long have rejected any distinction between 
“evidence of a crime” and “contraband.”  See Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1647 
(1967) (“Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment 
supports the distinction between ‘mere evidence’ and 
instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband.”).  And as we 
have indicated throughout this opinion, the prevailing standard 
for establishing probable cause refers interchangeably to 
probable cause for the presence of both contraband and evidence 
of a crime.         
Finally, we reject any contention that the answer to the 
question of whether a crime has been “completed” (as the 
District Court suggested was the case here when Donahue did 
not surrender as required) or was “continuous” could provide a 
tool helpful in an assessment of whether there was probable 
cause for a search.  After all, many, if not most, crimes are 
“completed” by the time of a lawful search during the 
investigation of the crime, and frequently the perpetrator has 
been identified before the search, but investigators nevertheless 
make the search to uncover evidence useful in a prosecution.  
The determination of the point at which the elements 
constituting a crime can be said to have been completed is 
simply not material to a court’s determination of whether there 
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was probable cause for a search in furtherance of the 
investigation of the crime.  Accordingly, though it is clear from 
the record that the government had compelling evidence that 
Donahue had committed the crime of failing to surrender before 
its agents searched his vehicle, indeed even before its agents 
arrested him, and such evidence might have lessened the need 
for a search, the search was lawful.     
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s November 19, 2013 order suppressing evidence found in 
the Ford Mustang.  Because the government has not appealed 
from the order to the extent that it suppressed evidence taken 
from Donahue’s hotel room, that aspect of the Court’s order will 
remain undisturbed.  We will remand the case to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 
